Union-Nonunion Earnings Differentials and the Decline of Private-Sector Unionism by Edwards, Richard & Swaim, Paul
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Economics Department Faculty Publications Economics Department 
May 1986 
Union-Nonunion Earnings Differentials and the Decline of Private-
Sector Unionism 
Richard Edwards 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, redwards1@unl.edu 
Paul Swaim 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/econfacpub 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Edwards, Richard and Swaim, Paul, "Union-Nonunion Earnings Differentials and the Decline of Private-
Sector Unionism" (1986). Economics Department Faculty Publications. 4. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/econfacpub/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at DigitalCommons@University 
of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Department Faculty Publications by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Union-Nonunion Earnings Differentials and 
the Decline of Private-Sector Unionism 
By RICHARD EDWARDS AND PAUL SWAIM* 
Recent years have been difficult ones for 
the American labor movement. Especially 
during the past half-decade, the economic 
and political environment for unions has be- 
come increasingly hostile-dominated by a 
growing anti-union sentiment in manage 
ment; the adverse effects of industrial re- 
structuring, import competition, deregula- 
tion, and high unemployment; and the tight- 
ening constraints of a labor law and NLRB 
enforcement mechanism that have become 
markedly less supportive of unions. These 
and other external changes, as well as some 
continuing internal weaknesses, have thrust 
unions into a period of declining union 
membership, eroding bargaining strength, re- 
peated contract concessions, and what at least 
some observers have perceived as the begin- 
ning of a "new era" bindustrial relations 
(Thomas Kochan and Michael Piore, 1985; 
Edwards and Michael Podgursky, 1986). 
In the specific area of wage setting, recent 
and continuing concession bargaining by 
unions has attracted the most attention. 
Union retreats in steel, autos, and trans- 
portation have been highly publicized, but 
'geyal,recent studies have suggested that the 
decline in union bargaining strength has ex- 
tended as well to construction, ,retail food- 
gtores,'and other industries not :immediately 
affedted by such pressures as h$rt compe- 
tition or deregulation. A large and unprece- 
dented fraction of settlements now involve 
wage freezes or reductions. And, if current 
union members face bleak settlements, the 
proliferation of two-tier wage provisions may 
presage even more severe cuts for future 
employees (Charles Craypo, 1981; Daniel 
Mitchell, 1985). 
Despite these developments, there remains 
the question of whether bargaining under 
these conditions has in fact resulted in a 
substantial compression of union-nonunion 
earnings differentials. The union-nonunion 
wage effect has typically been estimated by 
cross-section studies using micro data on un- 
ion and nonunion workers (Richard Free- 
man and James Medoff, 1981, Table 1). But 
until recently .it has not been possible to 
replicate these studies for the 1980's, since 
collection of union membership data in the 
Current Ropulation Survey (CPS) was tem- 
porarily suspended. 
Drawing upon recently released CPS data 
for 1984, we find that the union relative wage 
gap in the private sector remains substantial 
and does not seem to have narrowed since 
1979. Indeed, in contrast to what perhaps 
has been commonly assumed, union and 
nonunion wages may actually have drifted 
farther apart. While the causes of this out- 
come remain to be studied, we conclude that 
the most striking aspect of reoent experience 
is not a rapid compression of union earnings 
premiums, but rather their general per- 
sistence. In effect, labor's ,, changing cir- 
cumstances seem to be reflected in a quantity 
rather than a price adjustment: the union 
wage differential has not changed, and in- 
stead there has been a rapid substitution of 
nonunion for union workers. 
I. Model and R e d t s  
In order to determine the effect of .union- 
ization on earnings we estimated the follow- 
ing reduced-form earnings equation: 
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cupation, and industry dummies; these vari- 
ables capture variation -in human capital in: 
vestments and other worker and job char- 
acteristics influencing earnings. The U is a 
dummy variable taking the value one if the 
worker is covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement at his or her current job. Thus, the 
estimated coefficient bf this variable mea- 
sures the natural log of the ratio of union to 
nonunion earnings, which is approximately 
the proportionate union-nonunion earnings 
gap (the exact proportionate differential is 
exp(B,)- 1). We use a union coverage vari- 
able rather than a union membership dummy 
since nonunion workers coVered by collective 
bargaining agreements (some 2 ~ 3  percent of 
the labor force) by law receive identical ben- 
efits as union members. Hence, a ,union 
membership dummy may yield a biased 
estimate of the union wage effect. Finally, we 
assume that unmeasured variation ' in re- 
munerative worker and job characteristics is 
uncorrelated with our independent variables 
and is imbedded in the mean-zero indepen- 
dent and identically distributed residual ei. 
- Equation (1) was estimated on .a lirge 
sample of nonfarm private wage and salary 
workers from the May and June, 1984 CPS. 
I n  order to capture industry interaction 
effects, we stratifled the sample by broad 
industry groups and estimated equation (1) 
within each group. ,-For comparison we esti- 
mated the same models on a smaller sample 
of workers from the ,May 1979 CPS Pension 
Survey, which 'include's matched June earn- 
ings records (Wesley Mellow, 1983). In both 
samples we excluded managers, professional 
workers, and private household workers in 
order to focus on a somewhat more homoge- 
neous and organized segment of the labor 
force. F-tests allowed us to reject the hy- 
pothesis that the earnings equations were 
identical across these broad industry groups. 
Race, sex, and Hispanic ethnicity union in- 
teractions were insignificant in the stratified 
regressions in both years. 
Ordinary least squares estimates of tbe 
union coverage coefficient (B, )  and related 
statistics are reported in Table 2. p e  coeffi- 
cient of union %yerage took its expected 
positive coefficient and w& highly significant 
in all sectors in both 1979 and 1984. The 
TABLE 1 -ESTIMATED UNION-NONUNION EARNINGS 
DIFFERENTIALS AND UNIONIZATION RATES: 
MAY-JUNE 1979, AND MAY-JUNE 19848 
(Dependent Variable = Natural Log of Hourly Earnings) 
May-June, 1979 May-June, 1984 
- 
Industry a b ~ b  b 
Mining. Forestry .470 .22zc .204 .21gC -.004 
and Fisheries (.049) (.062) (.079) 
Construction .375 .369' .274 ' .436' .067 
(.027) (.024) 1.036) 
Manufacturing .440 .130C .320 .lMc .020 
(.all) (.011) (.016) 
Trans.. Comm., 
and Public, .615 .229' .462 .300C .069b 
'Utilities (.026) (.023)' (.035) 
-Trade and .I12 .202' .088 .21T .015 
Services , (.015) (.014) (.021) 
Sources: May 1979 CPS ~dnsion S G e y  and 1984 Ear&& 
File. Microdata tapes available from sthe Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
'Means and OLS estimates of the coefficient of union 
contract coverage d h m y  variable were obtained by esti- 
mating equation (1) within each of the industrial groups 
shown above. Within each industry group, managers, pro- 
fessionals, and private household workers were excluded. In 
addition to union coverage, the egression included controls 
for education, race, Hispanic ethniaty, sex; years of labor 
market experience, household head, veteran, SMSA resi- 
dence, region, part-time work, and 7 occupation dummy 
variables. Industry dummies varied with the sample, rang- 
ing from 1 in Mining, Forestry, and Fisheries, to 16 in 
manufacturing. A complete set of regression coeffiaents 
and related statistics are in a separate appendix available 
from the authors. 
b~ignificant at a .05 level of mnfideke. , 
'Significant at a .O1 level of confidence. - ' 
, . 
union coefficient differed significantly acrass 
sectors, and in 1984 it was lowest in Manu- 
facturing and highest .in ,Construction and 
Transportation, Communication, and Public 
Utilities. This cross-section pattern may re- 
flect a more elastic demand for tmion labor 
in Manufacturing since offshore production, 
plant relocation, or imports do not provide 
as ready substitutes for union labor in.the 
latter industries as they.do in Manufactur- 
ing. , , , ,  , P .  , 
Our focus, however, is not on, cross-section 
patterns, but on changes over , time-and 
here the results are rather surprising. The 
unionization rate in our sample declined from 
27.8 t o  19.0 percent over, these five years, 
reflecting the sharp medium-term decline re- 
ported by', the BLS and continuing the 
longer-term trend noted by many researchers 
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(Larry Adarns, 1985; Freeman and Medoff, 
1984, ch. 15). Sharp declines also occurred 
within each of our broad industry groups, 
ranging from approximately 3 percentage 
points in services to over 25 percentage points 
in Mining, Forestry, and Fisheries. 
In spite of very sharp declines in the 
unionization rate, the union-nonunion earn- 
ings differential remained relatively stable or 
widened within each of these broad in- 
dustrial sectors. The last column of the table 
shows that, with the exception of Mining, 
Forestry, and Fisheries, the estimated union- 
nonunion differential widened in every in- 
dustry group examined. The widening is sta- 
tistically significant (and then only at a 5 
percent level of confidence) only in Trans- 
portation, Communication, and Public Utili- 
ties. 
The estimates in Table 1 constrain the 
union wage effect to be the same across 
industries within these rather broad in- 
dustrial groups. We also examined possible 
industry-union interaction effects within sev- 
eral of these broad industrial groups. In 
Transportation, Communications, and Pub- 
lic Utilities, we tested whether the union- 
nonunion wage gap in recently deregulated 
industries exhibited a different trend. The 
only significant interaction was trucking 
services, where the union-nonunion gap 
dropped from .328 to .308, a statistically 
insignificant decline. Union-industry interac- 
tions in the earnings equation for manufac- 
turing showed a widening gap in nine in- 
dustries and narrowing gap in nine others. In 
no industry, however, was the change signifi- 
cant at a 5 percent level of confidence. In 
four cases the change was significant at a 10 
percent level of' konfidence: three with a 
widening gap (Food and Tobacco, Basic and 
Fabricated ~ e t a l ,  and Electrical Machinery 
and Equipment]: and one with a compressed 
gap (Rubber and Plastic Products). The 1979 
employment-weighted sum of the changes 
was + 1.2 percqntage points, approximately 
equal to the chdnge reported in Table 1. 
II. Discussion 
These findings are surprising given the 
considerable attention that has focused on 
concession bargaining by unions. Before at- 
tempting to explain them, we note that our 
findings are consistent with more aggregated 
wage-trend data published by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. The Wage and Salary Em- 
ployment Cost Index indicates that between 
1979 and 1984 union wages rose 5.1 percent 
more than nonunion wages in manufacturing 
and 5.6 percent more in nonmanufacturing 
industries (U.S. Department of Labor, 1985, 
p. 38). Nonetheless, we view the results in 
Table 1 as preliminary since the matched 
May-June 1979 sample may not be fully 
comparable with the 1984 sample, which 
simply pools May and June CPS records 
(difficulties in matching records could have 
resulted in nonrandom attrition from the 
sample). We are currently constructing data 
files for 1978 and 1979 that avoid this poten- 
tial problem. 
Perhaps the most straightforward interpre- 
tation of these findings would focus on price- 
quantity adjustments. It could be argued that, 
faced with increasingly elastic demand for 
their members' services, most unions have 
evidently chosen to maintain established 
wage levels; the result has been dramatic 
reductions in employment, This interpreta- 
tion, of course, is at odds with journalistic 
accounts emphasizing a perceived willingness 
of many union negotiators to trade sub- 
stantial wage and benefit concessions for 
enhanced job security. It would similarly 
confound Colin Lawrence and Robert 
Lawrence's provocative 1985 analysis of re- 
cent wage developments in manufacturing, 
since their analysis relies heavily on the no- 
tion that union wage demands vary inversely 
with the elasticity of demand. But, in this 
interpretation, our results would indicate that 
unions assign a lower priority to maintaining 
membership levels than is commonly be- 
lieved. 
There are, however, several reasons to be 
cautious about this wage inflexibility in- 
terpretation. First, in the Wage and Salary 
Employment Cost Index mentioned above, 
nonunion earnings growth exceeded union 
earnings growth in manufacturing industries 
in 1983 and 1984, and in nonmanufacturing 
industries in 1984. Thus, it may be that 
concession bargaining has only very recently 
Copyright O 2001 All Rights Reserved 
100 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MA Y 1986 
become widespread enough to be reflected in 
broad wage averages. In the same vein, as 
was already mentioned, two-tier wage scales 
have sometimes been implemented that par- 
tially shield existing employees from the full 
brunt of the compensation cuts that have 
been negotiated. If these provisions remain 
in effect, the impact on earnings will con- 
tinue to grow as the current work force is 
progressively replaced by new workers. 
Second, while our list of control variables 
is extensive and includes general labor 
market experience, we were not able to con- 
trol for a possible rise in the average senior- 
ity of unionized workers, since data on em- 
ployer-specific job tenure was not collected 
in the 1984 CPS surveys. Seniority plays an 
important role in layoff and recall in most 
union contracts, so it is highly likely that 
workers who have weathered the shakeout in 
the union sector have greater seniority rela- 
tive to an average nonunion worker in 1984 
as compared to 1979. Thus, the coefficients 
for union coverage in the 1984 earnings r e  
gressions could be biased upward relative to 
the 1979 coefficients and the extent of union 
wage flexibility correspondingly understated. 
The May 1979 CPS, which included in- 
formation on employer-specific seniority, 
showed, not surprisingly, a strong correla- 
tion between seniority and age. Indirect evi- 
dence on the magnitude of effect of changes 
in seniority on estimated union wage effects 
can thus be gleaned from an examination of 
union-nonunion age gaps. In 1979, union 
workers were already older than nonunion 
workers, yet these average gaps widened ap- 
preciably between 1979 and 1984 in all sec- 
tors except trade and service. If we assume 
that the same five-year changes apply to 
comparisons of average seniority levels be- 
tween union and nonunion workers, then the 
product of these estimated increases in aver- 
age seniority gaps with estimates of the 
marginal earnings effect of more seniority 
provides an indication of the extent of up- 
ward bias in the union coverage coefficients. 
The results of these calculations (described 
in a statistical appendix available upon re- 
quest), indicate that plausible shifts in aver- 
age seniority levels were appreciable, but 
probably too small to have obscured a sub- 
stantial compression of union sector wages. - 
The apparent predominance of quantity 
adjustments over price adjustments revealed 
in Table 1 may also reflect a second com- 
positional effect that further obscures the 
extent of union wage flexibility. Just as higher 
seniority members were probably more suc- 
cessful in negotiating the rapid decline in 
union membership within each bargaining 
unit, differential survival probabilities across 
bargaining units may also have played a role 
in maintaining the union wage differentials 
inherited from the 1970's. One source of the 
rapid decline in union membership has been 
the loss of locals representing workers at 
establishments that were either closed or re- 
organized to operate nonunion. This attrition 
may have been most pronounced in estab- 
lishments where unions already failed to 
negotiate compensation levels commensurate 
to those achieved by other union locals. A 
"survival of the fittest" effect could then 
have resulted in stable or rising average 
union-nonunion earnings differentials even 
though many surviving unions made sub- 
stantial concessions: the "give-backs" negoti- 
ated by surviving unions being offset by the 
disproportionate elimination of the weakest 
union contracts from the universe of current 
contracts. 
Although the CPS data provide no infor- 
mation with which to test the hypothesis just 
offered, it is consistent with the higher com- 
pensation levels typical of larger employers 
and with what anecdotal evidence suggests is 
a more rapid de-unionization of small firms. 
In some manufacturing industries, for exam- 
ple, where the large, core employers remain 
unionized, the deunionization of the periph- 
ery has been encouraged by the expansion of 
outsourcing to small, nonunion firms. Simi- 
larly, in trucking and construction, large 
unionized core employers have themselves 
acquired small nonunion peripheral firms in 
order to expand into new markets-a phe- 
nomenon termed "double-breasting" by 
unions. Both of these practices particularly 
disadvantage small, unionized firms that find 
themselves in direct competition with these 
nonunion producers. The higher mortality 
Co~vriaht O 2001 All Riahts Reserved 
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rates of small establishments (David 'Birch, 
1979) combined with the low and falling 
success rate of unions in representation elec- 
tions (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, ch. 15) 
also suggest that union penetration has 
eroded most rapidly in smaller establish- 
ments. Thus, the union-nonunion gap may 
have widened not because unions continued 
to obtain relatively higher wage settlements 
than their nonunion counterparts, but be- 
cause union control of their jurisdiction is 
slipping away most rapidly where wages are 
lowest. 
III. Conclusion 
Our examination of the changes in union- 
ization rates and earnings differentials b e  
tween 1979 and 1984 indicates that non- 
union workers have very rapidly been sub- 
stituted for union workers in the face of a 
stable or slightly widened union-nonunion 
earnings differential. The failure of the earn- 
ings differential to decline is surprising, given 
the widely reported and apparently substan- 
tial erosion of union bargaining power. 
Several different interpretations of these 
results are possible. One could interpret them 
as suggesting that in fact union bargaining 
power has not declined. This seems unlikely 
and inconsistent with the sharp fall in union- 
ization rates and much other evidence. Alter- 
natively, one could argue that our results 
indicate a lack of wage flexibility: in the 
union sector: while unions have been able to 
maintain the relative price of. their 'labor, in 
so doing they have placed the burden of 
adjustment to their deterihatkg &cum- 
stances on the quantity response. Sdch an 
interpretation might be used to suggest that 
if unions had been willing to 'reduce the 
union wage premium, the resulting quantity 
adjustment would have been less. 
A third explanation would place more 
stress on the institutional relationships in- 
volved to suggest that our results may be 
masking a somewhat more complicated story. 
Union jobs may have been lost in marginal 
and peripheral enterprises due to import 
penetration, deregulation, and the relative 
ease with which union workers could be 
replaced by nonunion workers, resulting in 
the subsequent retrenchment of the union 
sector to a pool of older, high-tenure workers 
in a shrinking core of large establishments. If 
true, these compositional shifts have ap- 
parently more than offset the very poor (by 
historical standards) wage settlements that a 
number ofunions have been forced to accept. 
Under these circumstances, there may have 
been no reasonable concessions that unions 
could have made that would have stemmed 
the loss of union jobs. 
The last interpretation, while consistent 
with fragmented and anecdotal data, is obvi- 
ously speculative and requires confirmation 
from further survey data. Moreover, the sec- 
ond and third explanations are not mutually 
exclusive and may be valid in differing de- 
grees for different industries. Finally, the im- 
pact of continued concession bargaining on 
broad measures of union wage effects may 
become much more, pronounced as these 
compositional effects run their course. 
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